The relative decline of the West - its global reputation, influence and share of buying power - is set to be theme of this half of the twenty-first century. If more politicians were amoral, cynical geographers, it might have been avoided.
Part 1: China's debt to the West.
There is one respect in which Donald Trump's view on American trade with China has some reasoned basis: there can be little doubt that China's meteoric economic growth over the last three decades has been primarily fuelled by international trade. In short, a nominally communist, totalitarian, one-party dictatorship has derived an enormous benefit by cunningly channelling the proceeds of globalised capitalism, via its abundance of cheap labour, into the coffers of the state and of state-owned companies.
If China is a rising threat to Western hegemony, the West really only has itself to blame.
Integrating new countries into world trade will inevitably result in them getting richer: in the case of demographic behemoths like China and India, this is bound to eventually affect not just regional but global geopolitics. Where mere capitalism is the cause of that rise, there is no sense of moral debt to the West: companies have merely been acting in their own interests, and certain countries have grown more powerful as a by-product.
In brief, since China's rise is due not to foreign aid from the US and Europe, but merely to corporate self-interest in rich countries, it has been able to decouple the idea of prosperity from the Western political model - democracy based on freedom of expression; having done this, there is really no reason for China to aspire to that model. Freedom - individual freedoms, as distinct from market liberalisation - has lost its biggest selling-point to the developing world.
Part 2: Decolonisation and development: Western policy towards low-income countries 1945-2000.
Bluntly, if (and only if) Western nations wished to retain their global influence, then it was ultimately in their interests for the rest of the world to remain at least relatively poor - or at least, only to get rich in an obviously indebted way.
One would have thought this would have been obvious to post-war policy-makers; if it were, then it is quite remarkable how badly they have managed it since WW2. Perhaps mere arrogance led them to assume that ethnic West Eurasians ran the world by default; that their authority would never really be challenged; that even if or when "the Third World" became more well-off, living standards in the West would always remain so far ahead that Western countries would remain the goal to aspire to. Perhaps the rise of China, for example, only seems predictable with hindsight; the enrichment of low-income countries was not at all apparent during decolonisation. Perhaps corporate interests, the engine of capitalism, carried more weight in twentieth-century policy-making than geopolitical predictions.
In my view, the primary explanation is probably that simple morality made such cynical views of the national interest, if not unthinkable, then at least un-actionable. Corporate interests, lack of geopolitical foresight, and other more pressing agendas, such as demonstrating the superior merits of capitalism over communism, doubtless also played an important role.
Part 3: Geopolitics and emerging powers: 2000-2050.
On the bright side, tensions with rising powers, such as the South China Sea disputes, may be the exception rather than the rule: there are few other areas of the globe where the geopolitical interests of an emerging power conflict so markedly with an established one. India, for example, can expand its regional influence considerably without really touching a Western country's residual sphere of influence (as a capitalist democracy it is, helpfully, ideologically close to the West anyway). The same can probably be said for Nigeria.
It is difficult to know just what China's endgame is in the Western Pacific. If it seeks to expand, it will probably get away with it: when one regional power is so much bigger than its nearest competitor (Japan), it is difficult to see how any balance of power would be maintained - without American involvement. Perhaps, however, the end of US involvement with its old Pacific allies will never come. China's rise will not be meteoric forever; its geopolitical ambitions may, for all we know, be limited to the South China Sea. Compromises may be possible. Perhaps a long-term US/China strategic standoff is the new equilibrium.
Tuesday, 13 February 2018
Sunday, 21 January 2018
Turkish invasion of Afrin
The Western powers cannot ignore Turkey's effective declaration of war today on the Syrian Kurds. Turkey may be an ally, but it is in the wrong.
The reputations of the USA and UK in the Middle East could scarcely be poorer. If we care to have any role in the region, and we clearly do, then we cannot keep treating regional allies as fair-weather friends. Our promises to them cannot be ignored whenever it is expedient, unless we learned nothing from the case of Palestine. The YPG, although not a unified entity, is broadly speaking a key Western ally which has done the bulk of the heavy lifting against the self-styled Islamic State, and on this basis deserves to be treated with the same respect as any other ally. Yet with its threats against both Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has made it clear that it does not significantly distinguish between NATO- and Russian-allied YPG factions. They're all Kurds, right?
Turkey is in the wrong about the Kurds. Ankara has been condemned repeatedly for human rights abuses against them in the European Court of Human Rights. To equate Kurds with terrorists may be popular in Turkey, but it is blatantly racist. It is difficult not to conclude this has nothing to do with national security and everything to do with limiting the chances of the emergence of any form of Kurdish autonomy among Turkey's neighbours, particularly given its history of maltreatment of its own Kurdish minority.
But Turkey has very little right to interfere with the Kurds in Syria, and the indiscriminate manner of the present attempt undermines their excuse. Any alleged ties to armed insurgencies within Turkey should be dealt with by diplomatic means, rather than military force. Otherwise, the Western powers may reasonably assume that Ankara is pursuing a war against Kurdish groups in neighbouring countries for more cynical ends.
Erdogan has presumably made a calculation that Turkey's NATO "allies" will protest a great deal in the UN, but ultimately do nothing - much like what has been going on with his brutal, paranoid crackdown against his political opponents. Perhaps he believes he has his allies' hands tied, thanks to the importance of Turkey's strategic location to the USA and UK, and the pending threat of re-opening the refugee flood-gates if the EU annoys him too much. Doubtless he is also taking into account the personality and numerous distractions facing the US president, and estimating the likelihood that Trump will overly care as quite low. He presumably also calculates, no doubt correctly, that the US will not stick with its Kurdish allies in Manbij over Turkey.
But it should.
If Turkey attacks the ally of several of its fellow NATO members, the burden is on Ankara to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the group in question really was meaningfully threatening it. But more pragmatic geopolitical considerations than what is right or true are likely to have much more sway over the American, British and French responses to his move. Kicking Turkey out of NATO will probably not seem like a viable response - although, given Russian (and pro-Assad Syrian) condemnation of Turkey's attack on Afrin, it might not be the worst time to do it; and Erdogan does make a horrific mockery of whatever values NATO might otherwise generally be supposed to stand for.
But for Erdogan, this would merely be evidence he could use that the US is not Turkey's friend: he would then find it even easier to justify attacking Kurdish groups which are incidentally also US allies, and the US is pretty unlikely to be drawn into another Middle-Eastern war, let alone with Turkey. Turkey could probably expect to be hit by sanctions, but not much else - although it might be hard put to find other allies in its region.
Ankara may have outmanoeuvred his Western "allies" into forcing them to give up any meaningful support for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, now that those groups have more or less served their purpose - I suspect that is the real end-game, as Turkey has been livid about it for years. Of course, the grown-up response would be to start treating their own Kurdish community properly, but Erdogan has long made it abundantly clear he does not care about either his own integrity or the human cost of his own putrid politics.
The reputations of the USA and UK in the Middle East could scarcely be poorer. If we care to have any role in the region, and we clearly do, then we cannot keep treating regional allies as fair-weather friends. Our promises to them cannot be ignored whenever it is expedient, unless we learned nothing from the case of Palestine. The YPG, although not a unified entity, is broadly speaking a key Western ally which has done the bulk of the heavy lifting against the self-styled Islamic State, and on this basis deserves to be treated with the same respect as any other ally. Yet with its threats against both Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has made it clear that it does not significantly distinguish between NATO- and Russian-allied YPG factions. They're all Kurds, right?
Turkey is in the wrong about the Kurds. Ankara has been condemned repeatedly for human rights abuses against them in the European Court of Human Rights. To equate Kurds with terrorists may be popular in Turkey, but it is blatantly racist. It is difficult not to conclude this has nothing to do with national security and everything to do with limiting the chances of the emergence of any form of Kurdish autonomy among Turkey's neighbours, particularly given its history of maltreatment of its own Kurdish minority.
But Turkey has very little right to interfere with the Kurds in Syria, and the indiscriminate manner of the present attempt undermines their excuse. Any alleged ties to armed insurgencies within Turkey should be dealt with by diplomatic means, rather than military force. Otherwise, the Western powers may reasonably assume that Ankara is pursuing a war against Kurdish groups in neighbouring countries for more cynical ends.
Erdogan has presumably made a calculation that Turkey's NATO "allies" will protest a great deal in the UN, but ultimately do nothing - much like what has been going on with his brutal, paranoid crackdown against his political opponents. Perhaps he believes he has his allies' hands tied, thanks to the importance of Turkey's strategic location to the USA and UK, and the pending threat of re-opening the refugee flood-gates if the EU annoys him too much. Doubtless he is also taking into account the personality and numerous distractions facing the US president, and estimating the likelihood that Trump will overly care as quite low. He presumably also calculates, no doubt correctly, that the US will not stick with its Kurdish allies in Manbij over Turkey.
But it should.
If Turkey attacks the ally of several of its fellow NATO members, the burden is on Ankara to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the group in question really was meaningfully threatening it. But more pragmatic geopolitical considerations than what is right or true are likely to have much more sway over the American, British and French responses to his move. Kicking Turkey out of NATO will probably not seem like a viable response - although, given Russian (and pro-Assad Syrian) condemnation of Turkey's attack on Afrin, it might not be the worst time to do it; and Erdogan does make a horrific mockery of whatever values NATO might otherwise generally be supposed to stand for.
But for Erdogan, this would merely be evidence he could use that the US is not Turkey's friend: he would then find it even easier to justify attacking Kurdish groups which are incidentally also US allies, and the US is pretty unlikely to be drawn into another Middle-Eastern war, let alone with Turkey. Turkey could probably expect to be hit by sanctions, but not much else - although it might be hard put to find other allies in its region.
Ankara may have outmanoeuvred his Western "allies" into forcing them to give up any meaningful support for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, now that those groups have more or less served their purpose - I suspect that is the real end-game, as Turkey has been livid about it for years. Of course, the grown-up response would be to start treating their own Kurdish community properly, but Erdogan has long made it abundantly clear he does not care about either his own integrity or the human cost of his own putrid politics.
Friday, 19 January 2018
UK defence spending in its international context: part 1
US President Trump (who is, not to put too fine a point on the matter, not a figure I admire) is currently seeking to increase US defence spending by 10%. This amounts to about $54bn, or about £39bn sterling.
This 10% increase is comparable to the UK's entire defence budget of around £45bn ($60bn). This has been the approximate annual spend every year since 2011.
Although US military spending makes every other country's look tiny by comparison, as a proportion of its economy it is not quite such an outlier as it is sometimes made to sound. Considering the US economy (nominal GDP) is about eight times the size of the UK's, a defence budget ten or eleven times is a pretty proportional split.
There are only about a dozen countries (such as the US) that spend more than 3% of GDP on defence, and only about another dozen that spend above 2%. Russia spends 5.5%, but its real spending ($70bn) is comparable to the UK's ($60bn); China, like the UK, spends about 2% (but for a much higher total: around $200bn). The UK is still one of the world's top 5 or 10 biggest military spenders overall, close to France, India and Japan - roughly where we'd expect.
Total spend figures are pretty worthless. They give no indication of what the money is spent on and whether it is good value. Russia spends about the same as Saudi Arabia on defence, not much more than 10% of the US figure, but supposedly maintains 350,000 troops - five times Saudi Arabia, about three quarters the US. China spends a third or a quarter what the US does, but maintains three times as many ground troops. Meanwhile, despite its $60bn spend, serious concerns have been raised about Britain's operational capabilities - our ability to fight wars independently any more at all.
All this makes the NATO 2% target - the proportion of GDP that members of the alliance are expected to spend on defence - look pretty silly. Specific operational capability targets for each ally, allowing each state to play a useful role within the NATO framework, tailored not just to the size of its economy but to the state of its public finances and perhaps demographic considerations, would be much more useful. Such targets would have to be negotiated multilaterally, and adhering to them would have to be entirely voluntary - or they would certainly be seen as meddling.
Given how few NATO countries bother to meet the 2% target anyway, it's all a bit academic.
The USA and a few other players will always pull the weight - and they should be happy to: it is a crucial means of maintaining influence, and keeping partners onside from long-term antagonists (i.e. Russia). It is not really in US interests for the EU, or even EU countries, to do the heavy lifting on defence spending themselves: the more powerful the EU becomes, the less it has to care what America thinks - making Trump's original demands for greater European defence spending perversely short-sighted.
NATO has more than enough brute strength to beat off Russia in any fair fight - which would of course never occur in the first place, just as it hasn't since 1945, due to the imminent threat of mutual assured detruction. Boosting defence spending may be a comforting response to a perceived threat, but it is specious. The threats from Russia are propaganda and the weaponisation of ethnic Russian minorities in the old provinces of the Russian Empire, and defence spending has nothing to do with either.
This 10% increase is comparable to the UK's entire defence budget of around £45bn ($60bn). This has been the approximate annual spend every year since 2011.
Although US military spending makes every other country's look tiny by comparison, as a proportion of its economy it is not quite such an outlier as it is sometimes made to sound. Considering the US economy (nominal GDP) is about eight times the size of the UK's, a defence budget ten or eleven times is a pretty proportional split.
There are only about a dozen countries (such as the US) that spend more than 3% of GDP on defence, and only about another dozen that spend above 2%. Russia spends 5.5%, but its real spending ($70bn) is comparable to the UK's ($60bn); China, like the UK, spends about 2% (but for a much higher total: around $200bn). The UK is still one of the world's top 5 or 10 biggest military spenders overall, close to France, India and Japan - roughly where we'd expect.
Total spend figures are pretty worthless. They give no indication of what the money is spent on and whether it is good value. Russia spends about the same as Saudi Arabia on defence, not much more than 10% of the US figure, but supposedly maintains 350,000 troops - five times Saudi Arabia, about three quarters the US. China spends a third or a quarter what the US does, but maintains three times as many ground troops. Meanwhile, despite its $60bn spend, serious concerns have been raised about Britain's operational capabilities - our ability to fight wars independently any more at all.
All this makes the NATO 2% target - the proportion of GDP that members of the alliance are expected to spend on defence - look pretty silly. Specific operational capability targets for each ally, allowing each state to play a useful role within the NATO framework, tailored not just to the size of its economy but to the state of its public finances and perhaps demographic considerations, would be much more useful. Such targets would have to be negotiated multilaterally, and adhering to them would have to be entirely voluntary - or they would certainly be seen as meddling.
Given how few NATO countries bother to meet the 2% target anyway, it's all a bit academic.
The USA and a few other players will always pull the weight - and they should be happy to: it is a crucial means of maintaining influence, and keeping partners onside from long-term antagonists (i.e. Russia). It is not really in US interests for the EU, or even EU countries, to do the heavy lifting on defence spending themselves: the more powerful the EU becomes, the less it has to care what America thinks - making Trump's original demands for greater European defence spending perversely short-sighted.
NATO has more than enough brute strength to beat off Russia in any fair fight - which would of course never occur in the first place, just as it hasn't since 1945, due to the imminent threat of mutual assured detruction. Boosting defence spending may be a comforting response to a perceived threat, but it is specious. The threats from Russia are propaganda and the weaponisation of ethnic Russian minorities in the old provinces of the Russian Empire, and defence spending has nothing to do with either.
Saturday, 6 January 2018
ō tempora, ō morēs
Those who were both particularly privileged in their educational opportunities and/or nerdy in their subject choices might note a bit of a classical theme around this blog: Liternum was a town in Campania, Italy, while Lovernius is the latinised name of a southern Gallic chieftain.
The classical motifs are intended to be merely decorative: the blog deals mostly with politics, geography and economics - current affairs, rather than ancient. The hints of romanitas are just to offer a bit of the flavour of "civilisation". However I came across an opinion piece today in the Financial Times on the utility of studying Latin, and on which, given my own educational background - I loved Latin at school, and read Anglo-Saxon and Celtic at Cambridge - I thought I might venture a brief opinion of my own in the article's comment section. Here I expand and develop it.
The main thesis is utilitarian - the practical sense, rather than the philosophical. "Latin is an essential language for our digital age" because of the civility and civilised use of language it teaches. As I have discussed my views on the matter of civilisation previously, I will not re-iterate the arguments here - "civilised" is not a term Mr Auslin actually employs. I think, however, that the relativist perspective which underlies my earlier discussion on that topic may be usefully extended to Mr Auslin's seemingly rather prescriptivist approach to English. He finds contemporary English usage distasteful, considering that people need to "recover [...] the ability to use our own language" - although I am not sure that the argument that opting to speak a vernacular of some sort instead of a prescribed correct form necessarily implies weak powers of argument or expression. I think that there are arguments in defence of prescriptivism, but this seems like thinly veiled snobbery. Perhaps there are arguments in defence of that too...
My principal point however is not about prescriptivism, but about functionalism. Reducing the study of Latin to its practical usefulness in the form of e.g. transferable skills is, to my mind, a pity, perhaps born of an education system that is increasingly oriented towards preparation for the "world of work", rather than education gratiā education. The functionalist approach is, of course, perfectly understandable, given the competitivity of the contemporary labour market, and the significant constraints on many schools' budgets.
Yet as far as learning critical thinking, powerful expression, how to "assess information critically, articulate ideas and convey them eloquently," or "being able to break down and rebuild sentences" in order "clearly to comprehend or construct a thought" - all of these skills might be acquired from the study of many a modern language and its literature, if the texts to be studied are chosen with these ends in mind. As far as utility is concerned, this would also have the benefit of picking up the modern language. Latin can never win on this basis, because the contemporary language will almost always be seen to be more useful.
I decided long ago that the arguments in favour of Latin's utility are always fundamentally weak. They fail to persuade because they miss the point.
Latinists, and students and lovers of other dead languages, need make no more apology for what they do than an artist. Their sole crime is merely not to be overly preoccupied with the market value of what they do - let us hope there is a place for such people in a civilised society.
Perhaps the primary purpose of learning a dead language should be to read what is written in it, simply because what is written in it is worth reading. This is a pretty solid argument for learning any dead or rare language - access to the literature of an entire culture (or multiple cultures: for example, both classical Rome and medieval Europe), in the original language. The weakness with this argument is, of course, the existence of translations: this is particularly in evidence for all the even moderately well-known classical texts, the meanings of which have often been studied and debated for a few hundred years.
One must turn then to the debate on the value of reading something in the original rather than in translation. In very brief, in my opinion, one is likely to get somewhat closer to the intended meaning by reading in the original - but learning an entire language well enough to do so for only a small number of texts may feel like a poor return-on-investment. What is more, even if one does so, there will still be ambiguity in the original text; then there are questions about the editing of the text by later scribes and scholars, and difficult or variant readings in different surviving manuscripts - one might learn a whole language and still not be sure what a crucial passage of the original text said.
Songs and poetry may be a good example of where learning the original language is likely to be especially valuable: where the form is as important as the content, one really cannot appreciate the original artistry except in the original words. In my experience, it is rare to find a good verse translation that is as accurate as it is beautiful; and often, they do not (sometimes cannot reasonably) employ the poem original metre. I would argue, for example, that the traditional Old English poetic metre is beautiful enough on its own to make learning the language worthwhile. The beauty of the form (as opposed to content) of the original texts is much less persuasive for prose however, at least when good translations exist.
Perhaps, in a way, I am still missing the point. If we are speaking of learning languages, then what of the language itself? One may simply find a particular language aesthetically pleasing; this may be a perfectly subjective judgement, but that should not prevent one from enjoying it. Alternatively, one may simply think or feel that knowing or using the language spoken in a particular period that one is especially attached to makes one feel closer to it.
In my opinion, these are the two most solid reasons for learning a dead language. As a result, dead languages really cannot be forced on anyone, and are likely to remain a niche interest. Is that so bad?
Utilitarian arguments for the study of dead languages are a bonus, not an end in themselves; dead languages and their literatures are legitimate primary objectives. Therefore, let people study them for the mere enjoyment of it. Perhaps this form of indulgence has merely fallen from fashion. In any case, I find it hard to imagine, in the foreseeable future, that Latin will ever actually die.
The classical motifs are intended to be merely decorative: the blog deals mostly with politics, geography and economics - current affairs, rather than ancient. The hints of romanitas are just to offer a bit of the flavour of "civilisation". However I came across an opinion piece today in the Financial Times on the utility of studying Latin, and on which, given my own educational background - I loved Latin at school, and read Anglo-Saxon and Celtic at Cambridge - I thought I might venture a brief opinion of my own in the article's comment section. Here I expand and develop it.
The main thesis is utilitarian - the practical sense, rather than the philosophical. "Latin is an essential language for our digital age" because of the civility and civilised use of language it teaches. As I have discussed my views on the matter of civilisation previously, I will not re-iterate the arguments here - "civilised" is not a term Mr Auslin actually employs. I think, however, that the relativist perspective which underlies my earlier discussion on that topic may be usefully extended to Mr Auslin's seemingly rather prescriptivist approach to English. He finds contemporary English usage distasteful, considering that people need to "recover [...] the ability to use our own language" - although I am not sure that the argument that opting to speak a vernacular of some sort instead of a prescribed correct form necessarily implies weak powers of argument or expression. I think that there are arguments in defence of prescriptivism, but this seems like thinly veiled snobbery. Perhaps there are arguments in defence of that too...
My principal point however is not about prescriptivism, but about functionalism. Reducing the study of Latin to its practical usefulness in the form of e.g. transferable skills is, to my mind, a pity, perhaps born of an education system that is increasingly oriented towards preparation for the "world of work", rather than education gratiā education. The functionalist approach is, of course, perfectly understandable, given the competitivity of the contemporary labour market, and the significant constraints on many schools' budgets.
Yet as far as learning critical thinking, powerful expression, how to "assess information critically, articulate ideas and convey them eloquently," or "being able to break down and rebuild sentences" in order "clearly to comprehend or construct a thought" - all of these skills might be acquired from the study of many a modern language and its literature, if the texts to be studied are chosen with these ends in mind. As far as utility is concerned, this would also have the benefit of picking up the modern language. Latin can never win on this basis, because the contemporary language will almost always be seen to be more useful.
I decided long ago that the arguments in favour of Latin's utility are always fundamentally weak. They fail to persuade because they miss the point.
Latinists, and students and lovers of other dead languages, need make no more apology for what they do than an artist. Their sole crime is merely not to be overly preoccupied with the market value of what they do - let us hope there is a place for such people in a civilised society.
Perhaps the primary purpose of learning a dead language should be to read what is written in it, simply because what is written in it is worth reading. This is a pretty solid argument for learning any dead or rare language - access to the literature of an entire culture (or multiple cultures: for example, both classical Rome and medieval Europe), in the original language. The weakness with this argument is, of course, the existence of translations: this is particularly in evidence for all the even moderately well-known classical texts, the meanings of which have often been studied and debated for a few hundred years.
One must turn then to the debate on the value of reading something in the original rather than in translation. In very brief, in my opinion, one is likely to get somewhat closer to the intended meaning by reading in the original - but learning an entire language well enough to do so for only a small number of texts may feel like a poor return-on-investment. What is more, even if one does so, there will still be ambiguity in the original text; then there are questions about the editing of the text by later scribes and scholars, and difficult or variant readings in different surviving manuscripts - one might learn a whole language and still not be sure what a crucial passage of the original text said.
Songs and poetry may be a good example of where learning the original language is likely to be especially valuable: where the form is as important as the content, one really cannot appreciate the original artistry except in the original words. In my experience, it is rare to find a good verse translation that is as accurate as it is beautiful; and often, they do not (sometimes cannot reasonably) employ the poem original metre. I would argue, for example, that the traditional Old English poetic metre is beautiful enough on its own to make learning the language worthwhile. The beauty of the form (as opposed to content) of the original texts is much less persuasive for prose however, at least when good translations exist.
Perhaps, in a way, I am still missing the point. If we are speaking of learning languages, then what of the language itself? One may simply find a particular language aesthetically pleasing; this may be a perfectly subjective judgement, but that should not prevent one from enjoying it. Alternatively, one may simply think or feel that knowing or using the language spoken in a particular period that one is especially attached to makes one feel closer to it.
In my opinion, these are the two most solid reasons for learning a dead language. As a result, dead languages really cannot be forced on anyone, and are likely to remain a niche interest. Is that so bad?
Utilitarian arguments for the study of dead languages are a bonus, not an end in themselves; dead languages and their literatures are legitimate primary objectives. Therefore, let people study them for the mere enjoyment of it. Perhaps this form of indulgence has merely fallen from fashion. In any case, I find it hard to imagine, in the foreseeable future, that Latin will ever actually die.
Tuesday, 19 December 2017
Terror of populism [2016]
This post was begun over a year ago, 6 December 2016, but I never finished it. All I had was the title, and the opening words: "It is easy to identify hysteria in..." I will briefly summarise roughly what I think I was going to say, although it seems much less relevant twelve months later.
It is easy to identify hysteria in much of the Centrist press regarding the current surge in Right-wing populist movements in several countries currently: brexit and Trump's victory are lumped together, along with a few other examples such as France, Austria, Poland and the Netherlands. At the time, when it was relevant, I would have argued firstly that the Leave and Trump campaigns were very different kinds of movements. Although both are anti-immigration and nationalist, Leave was strongly pro-free trade, while the Trump campaign was strongly protectionist, for example - the similarity disintegrates as soon as it is interrogated. Meanwhile, the examples of countries with strong populist movements mostly do not exhibit neither majority vote shares, nor do they account for a majority of countries across the West, never mind the globe.
While there does seem to have been a recent uptick in Right-wing populism in the West, it should not be overblown any more than it should be underestimated - or oversimplified: there were times in the wake of Brexit and Trump, perhaps in the six-month period either side of Christmas 2016, when even respectable news sources with a reputation for cool and rational analysis - I am really talking about The Economist - seemed almost hysterical about the rising tide of cognitive dissonance (too flippant?). It was an irritating, uninformative and un-pragmatic phase, which often seemed to be generally tarring a wide array of political constituencies in very broad-based movements in many different countries with the same brush of quasi-neo-Nazism; the sort of tone one would rather expect from The Guardian than TE (which is not to say that The Guardian never writes anything good)...
Thankfully it seems to be mostly over. One does not have to become subsumed by the feared "new normal" to analyse trends in public opinion with the proper objectivity, even in the interest of combating them...
It is easy to identify hysteria in much of the Centrist press regarding the current surge in Right-wing populist movements in several countries currently: brexit and Trump's victory are lumped together, along with a few other examples such as France, Austria, Poland and the Netherlands. At the time, when it was relevant, I would have argued firstly that the Leave and Trump campaigns were very different kinds of movements. Although both are anti-immigration and nationalist, Leave was strongly pro-free trade, while the Trump campaign was strongly protectionist, for example - the similarity disintegrates as soon as it is interrogated. Meanwhile, the examples of countries with strong populist movements mostly do not exhibit neither majority vote shares, nor do they account for a majority of countries across the West, never mind the globe.
While there does seem to have been a recent uptick in Right-wing populism in the West, it should not be overblown any more than it should be underestimated - or oversimplified: there were times in the wake of Brexit and Trump, perhaps in the six-month period either side of Christmas 2016, when even respectable news sources with a reputation for cool and rational analysis - I am really talking about The Economist - seemed almost hysterical about the rising tide of cognitive dissonance (too flippant?). It was an irritating, uninformative and un-pragmatic phase, which often seemed to be generally tarring a wide array of political constituencies in very broad-based movements in many different countries with the same brush of quasi-neo-Nazism; the sort of tone one would rather expect from The Guardian than TE (which is not to say that The Guardian never writes anything good)...
Thankfully it seems to be mostly over. One does not have to become subsumed by the feared "new normal" to analyse trends in public opinion with the proper objectivity, even in the interest of combating them...
Sunday, 6 November 2016
Constitutionally Leaving the EU
Over the last few days there has been a considerable flare-up over leaving the EU, after the High Court ruled that Parliament must have a say on the triggering of Article 50.
The right-wing tabloids were outraged: the Daily Mail front page branded the three judges behind the verdict as "ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE", making the Express's "Now your country really does need you: WE MUST GET OUT OF THE EU" and absurdly tacky Union Jack background seem moderate and restrained by comparison.
The right-wing tabloids were outraged: the Daily Mail front page branded the three judges behind the verdict as "ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE", making the Express's "Now your country really does need you: WE MUST GET OUT OF THE EU" and absurdly tacky Union Jack background seem moderate and restrained by comparison.
The reason they are annoyed is because everyone knows that MPs, even Tory MPs, were mostly opposed to leaving the EU; and Leavers are probably not being unreasonable in fearing that Parliament could block it from happening. People, including the right-wing press, seem generally convinced that Theresa May is genuinely committed to 'delivering brexit', and there has been a public sense in recent weeks and months that she may be gearing towards a (relatively) 'hard' brexit. Whether this is in fact the case, when everything is going on behind closed doors, is pretty unknowable; but I think that the populist Right is keen to avoid a 'soft' brexit, which they do not consider to be truly leaving the EU at all. This, they fear, would be Parliament's choice, so they prefer May to have a free hand.
This is not how May wanted things to go; personally, I was concerned that she was gearing towards a 'hard' brexit all on her own without that ever having been voted for by anyone. Whatever some may have thought, the referendum was not about weighing control of immigration against single market membership; the Leave side did not have present a united view on whether we would remain in or leave the single market, with some memorably claiming we could both have our cake and eat it on the topic. EU figures, meanwhile, have insisted all along that the 'four freedoms' go together as a package, and will not wish Britain to have a better or more attractive arrangement with it than we had prior to leaving.
If the government goes ahead with its appeal to the Supreme Court, I suspect that it will be defeated again. I suspect that a general "please can we activate Article 50" bill would scrape through the Commons, because MPs will not wish to be seen as going against the will of the people; but I think that it would almost certainly be blocked in the Lords - because the Lords is still full of Lib Dems appointed last parliament and has little fear of democratic accountability.
Last October, the House of Lords blocked a 2015 Tory manifesto commitment on tax credits, resulting in threats to curb the power of the Lords. If the Lords did something similar in this matter and blocked a brexit bill, I dare say that the outcry would be far, far greater. I suspect that May would be forced to follow through with or at least repeat Cameron's threats last year; Article 50 would probably then be delayed while our constitutional obfuscations are fudged, but I believe that May's authority in her party is likely to hold up long enough to see it through, albeit not by March.
I remain of the belief that Leave will happen - not necessarily in the sense that Nigel Farage would like. In any event, there certainly should be democratic oversight of May's negotiation agenda: she may be Prime Minister, but no one except her own constituents and Tory MPs ever voted for her.
Thursday, 23 June 2016
Britain and the European Union
Today the 23rd of June 2016 is a historic vote for Britain on our membership of the European Union.
It is a day of democracy, for which we should all be thankful and in which we can take pride.
Whatever the outcome, what matters is that Britain strives to be the best it can be, for its own citizens and for the world, working with the other peoples of Europe, and elsewhere, to counter the great shared challenges of our time. At the end of the day, we will always be a European country.
I would like to offer a word of thanks to the BBC for a coverage which I perceive to have been an honest attempt to be objective and to inform.
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FR - Aujourd'hui est une fête de la démocratie pour laquelle nous devrions de la reconnaissance et dont nous pouvons être justement fiers.
Quel que soit le résultat, ce qui est important est que la Grande Bretagne s'efforce à être le meilleur possible, vis à vis ses propres citoyens et le reste du monde, en travaillant avec les autres peuples de l'Europe et d'autres parts, pour combattre les défis communs formidables de notre époque. Après tout, nous serons toujours Européens.
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IT - Oggi è una festa della democrazia, per cui dovremmo essere riconoscenti ed in quale possiamo essere fieri.
Comunque vada, l'importante è che la Gran Bretagna si sforzi ad essere il meglio che possa, per i suoi cittadini e il mondo, collaborando con gli altri popoli dell'Europa e oltre, ad opporsi alle grandi sfide comuni del nostro evo. Infine saremo sempre una nazione dell'Europa.
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I would like to very briefly summarise the main areas in which I think each side has the upper hand in the argument. Most of those which I leave out are those where I think neither side really has much of an advantage, for example due to the uncertainty of the future (e.g. the direction of travel of the EU: there seems to be a consensus that the eurozone must integrate, but does that necessarily mean Britain must join or be marginalised? and what is the truth of talk about a European army, etc? I feel this area probably on balance lends itself to the leave case, but the level of uncertainty surrounding it make me feel it is not conclusive.)
Leave
1) Sovereignty.
One can talk about the value or indeed necessity of sharing sovereignty and the vanity of national identity as much as one likes; but at the end of the day, Britain as a state would be more independent if it were outside the EU, with full control over its own laws and all the other policy areas currently overseen by Brussels. Whether this would be better or worse is a separate matter.
2) Democracy and accountability.
This is closely connected to sovereignty. For better or worse the EU is not really a very democratic vehicle for decision-making; if you value democracy, then restoring full sovereignty to the British Parliament would straightforwardly be more democratic. It would prevent Parliament from being able to blame the EU for things, and the electorate would be able to vote out their lawmakers. In my view a vote to leave would be better for British democracy and make it healthier. (It would also resolve the European question once and for all, while staying will not make the leave movement go away.)
3) Immigration.
While leaving the EU would not necessarily automatically result in a drop in immigration, it would make it possible for a party to be elected that could actually bring this about. In all likelihood I think immigration would go down for a variety of reasons, not all of them good. If we remain however, freedom of movement is non-negotiable, and no immigration target can ever be guaranteed. However - see also emigration...
Remain
1) The economy.
There will probably be at least a short-term negative economic fall-out from a leave vote, of which nobody can be sure of the severity. We cannot be confident of a swift outcome from negotiations for a trade deal with the rEU, or of one that will be at least as good as that which we currently have. Being a member of the EU probably makes Britain a significantly more desirable place to invest. The leave argument for the economy focuses on regulation; I would be very unwilling to part with much of this, as "red tape" is in fact in many cases safeguards for things like the environment and workers' rights. The other argument is that we could pivot away from a declining Europe to growth markets elsewhere, but Europe is surely always going to be a very major market by dint of sheer proximity, and being in the EU by no means prevents trade with other countries.
2) International relations.
Clearly a leave vote will insult our geographically nearest allies, which might contribute to greater confrontationalism and illwill in our relations with the EU. It would probably weaken our soft power and influence in the world. Additionally, if it weakens Europe's economy or stability that presents an indirect but substantial threat to British interests.
3) Emigration.
The flip-side of immigration: free movement works in Britons' interests as well, with hundreds of thousands of Britons living and working abroad in Europe.
4) Regulation.
I think most EU regulation on businesses is probably good and progressive, and some parties with a very real chance of future government would not necessarily keep those safeguards.
----------
I think that there are very powerful arguments on both sides and that voting either way is perfectly rational and defensible. I hope that in the aftermath we will as a country come to an acceptance of the result either way and a greater understanding and appreciation of both sides' reasoning; although I greatly fear that this will not be the case.
Rule Britannia, and floreat Europa!
It is a day of democracy, for which we should all be thankful and in which we can take pride.
Whatever the outcome, what matters is that Britain strives to be the best it can be, for its own citizens and for the world, working with the other peoples of Europe, and elsewhere, to counter the great shared challenges of our time. At the end of the day, we will always be a European country.
I would like to offer a word of thanks to the BBC for a coverage which I perceive to have been an honest attempt to be objective and to inform.
----------
FR - Aujourd'hui est une fête de la démocratie pour laquelle nous devrions de la reconnaissance et dont nous pouvons être justement fiers.
Quel que soit le résultat, ce qui est important est que la Grande Bretagne s'efforce à être le meilleur possible, vis à vis ses propres citoyens et le reste du monde, en travaillant avec les autres peuples de l'Europe et d'autres parts, pour combattre les défis communs formidables de notre époque. Après tout, nous serons toujours Européens.
----------
IT - Oggi è una festa della democrazia, per cui dovremmo essere riconoscenti ed in quale possiamo essere fieri.
Comunque vada, l'importante è che la Gran Bretagna si sforzi ad essere il meglio che possa, per i suoi cittadini e il mondo, collaborando con gli altri popoli dell'Europa e oltre, ad opporsi alle grandi sfide comuni del nostro evo. Infine saremo sempre una nazione dell'Europa.
----------
I would like to very briefly summarise the main areas in which I think each side has the upper hand in the argument. Most of those which I leave out are those where I think neither side really has much of an advantage, for example due to the uncertainty of the future (e.g. the direction of travel of the EU: there seems to be a consensus that the eurozone must integrate, but does that necessarily mean Britain must join or be marginalised? and what is the truth of talk about a European army, etc? I feel this area probably on balance lends itself to the leave case, but the level of uncertainty surrounding it make me feel it is not conclusive.)
Leave
1) Sovereignty.
One can talk about the value or indeed necessity of sharing sovereignty and the vanity of national identity as much as one likes; but at the end of the day, Britain as a state would be more independent if it were outside the EU, with full control over its own laws and all the other policy areas currently overseen by Brussels. Whether this would be better or worse is a separate matter.
2) Democracy and accountability.
This is closely connected to sovereignty. For better or worse the EU is not really a very democratic vehicle for decision-making; if you value democracy, then restoring full sovereignty to the British Parliament would straightforwardly be more democratic. It would prevent Parliament from being able to blame the EU for things, and the electorate would be able to vote out their lawmakers. In my view a vote to leave would be better for British democracy and make it healthier. (It would also resolve the European question once and for all, while staying will not make the leave movement go away.)
3) Immigration.
While leaving the EU would not necessarily automatically result in a drop in immigration, it would make it possible for a party to be elected that could actually bring this about. In all likelihood I think immigration would go down for a variety of reasons, not all of them good. If we remain however, freedom of movement is non-negotiable, and no immigration target can ever be guaranteed. However - see also emigration...
Remain
1) The economy.
There will probably be at least a short-term negative economic fall-out from a leave vote, of which nobody can be sure of the severity. We cannot be confident of a swift outcome from negotiations for a trade deal with the rEU, or of one that will be at least as good as that which we currently have. Being a member of the EU probably makes Britain a significantly more desirable place to invest. The leave argument for the economy focuses on regulation; I would be very unwilling to part with much of this, as "red tape" is in fact in many cases safeguards for things like the environment and workers' rights. The other argument is that we could pivot away from a declining Europe to growth markets elsewhere, but Europe is surely always going to be a very major market by dint of sheer proximity, and being in the EU by no means prevents trade with other countries.
2) International relations.
Clearly a leave vote will insult our geographically nearest allies, which might contribute to greater confrontationalism and illwill in our relations with the EU. It would probably weaken our soft power and influence in the world. Additionally, if it weakens Europe's economy or stability that presents an indirect but substantial threat to British interests.
3) Emigration.
The flip-side of immigration: free movement works in Britons' interests as well, with hundreds of thousands of Britons living and working abroad in Europe.
4) Regulation.
I think most EU regulation on businesses is probably good and progressive, and some parties with a very real chance of future government would not necessarily keep those safeguards.
----------
I think that there are very powerful arguments on both sides and that voting either way is perfectly rational and defensible. I hope that in the aftermath we will as a country come to an acceptance of the result either way and a greater understanding and appreciation of both sides' reasoning; although I greatly fear that this will not be the case.
Rule Britannia, and floreat Europa!
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